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Skibine: Integrating the Indian Trust Doctrine into the Constitution

INTEGRATING THE INDIAN TRUST
DOCTRINE INTO THE CONSTITUTION
Alex Tallchief Skibine*
The Indian trust doctrine has had a long love-hate relationship with Indian tribes.1
On one hand, it has been used to sue the executive agencies of the federal government
for breach of trust. 2 On the other, it has been used to expand the plenary power of
Congress over Indian affairs. 3 While some scholars have argued that the trust doctrine
should be used to control the power of Congress, 4 the courts do not seem to be so
inclined. 5 Nevertheless, since the landmark decision of Morton v. Mancari,6 the trust
doctrine has been used to shield congressional legislation from strict scrutiny when
enacting legislation for the benefit of Indians. The Court in Mancari held that a law
giving Indians preference in employment within the Bureau of Indian Affairs was not a
classification based on race but on membership in quasi-sovereign political entities, the
Indian tribes. Therefore, the law was not unconstitutional "[a]s long as the special
treatment can be tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress' unique obligation toward
the indians." 7 It has been almost thirty years since Mancari was first decided, and the
decision is now under attack. 8 In the wake of such attacks, this article re-examines the

* Professor of Law, University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law; J.D., Northwestern University
(1976). 1 want to thank the students in my Indian Legislation class, given at the Northwestern School of Law
of Lewis and Clark College during the summer of 2003, for helping me think through some of the arguments
presented in this article. I also want to thank the University of Utah College of Law's Faculty Development
Fund for its financial assistance.
1. Some have said that it has been used on Indian tribes as both a sword and a shield. See Ray Torgerson,
Student Author, Sword Wielding and Shield Bearing: An Idealistic Assessment of the Federal Trust Doctrine in
American Indian Law, 2 Tex. Forum Civ. Libs. & Civ. Rights 165 (1996); Blake A. Watson, The Thrust and
Parry ofFederal Indian Law,23 U. Dayton L. Rev. 437, 450-56 (1998).
2. See U.S.v.White Mt.Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465 (2003); Reid Peyton Chambers, Judicial Enforcement
ofthe Federal Trust Responsibility to Indians,27 Stan. L. Rev. 1213 (1975).
3. See US.v.Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913); Lone Wolf v.Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903); US v.
Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
4. See Janice Aitken, The Trust Doctrine inFederal Indian Law: A Look at ItsDevelopment and at How
U. L. Rev. 115 (1997).
Scope, 18 N. 111.
Analysis under Social Contract Theory Might Expand Its
Its
5. See Mary Christina Wood, Indian Land and the Promise of Native Sovereignty: The Trust Doctrine
Revisited, 1994 Utah L. Rev. 1471, 1508-13.
6. 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
7. Id.at 555.
8. See Williams v. Babbitt, 115 F.3d 657, 663-66 (9th Cir. 1997) (arguing that extending Mancari to
preferences in employment beyond the Bureau of Indian Affairs would raise serious constitutional questions);
see e.g. L. Scott Gould, Mixing Bodies and Beliefs: The Predicament of Tribes, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 702, 71118(2001).
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legacy of Mancari in order to evaluate the role of the trust doctrine in determining the
extent of congressional power in Indian Affairs.
The thesis of this article is that the ultimate legacy of Mancariwas to integrate the
trust doctrine into the Indian Commerce Clause of the Constitution. While scholars have
argued that the so-called plenary power of Congress, along with federal Indian law,
needs to be decolonized 9 or domesticated by importing international law principles,' 0 I
believe that in constitutionalizing the trust doctrine, the Court has in fact already
imposed some constraints on congressional power.11 The problem is that the Court has
not yet fully realized what it has done. This article explains the legal ramifications of the
constitutional integration of the trust doctrine. After explaining the thesis through an
analysis of the evolution and interrelationship of the plenary power and the trust
doctrines in Part I, the article explores the implications of the thesis by examining four
distinct issues in Part II. The four issues are: (1) the power of Congress to enact
legislation interfering with tribal self-government; (2) the power of Congress to
terminate or refuse to recognize legitimate Indian tribes; (3) the power of Congress to
reaffirm inherent tribal powers; and (4) the power of Congress to extend the trust
relationship to individual Indians. To bring these four issues into focus with current
contexts, they will be analyzed through an examination of recent court decisions.
I.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE TRUST DOCTRINE AND ITS RELATIONSHIP
WITH CONGRESSIONAL PLENARY POWER IN INDIAN AFFAIRS.

In her landmark article on the plenary power of Congress over Indian affairs, Nell
Newton wrote that the trust doctrine is "not constitutionally based and thus not
enforceable against Congress."' 12 In an article making important contributions to a
deeper understanding of the trust doctrine, Mary Christina Wood lamented that while the
trust doctrine plays an important role as a check on the power of the executive branch,
using the trust as a check on the power of Congress has been somewhat of a "retreating
mirage." 13 She further decried the association of the trust doctrine with the plenary
power doctrine. In this part, I argue that the trust doctrine and the plenary power
doctrine are in fact interrelated, but in a positive way, at least from a tribal perspective.
My argument is that since Mancariand United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians,14 both
the plenary power and the trust doctrines have been integrated into the Constitution.
Following Dean Newton's thinking, since the doctrine is now constitutionally based, it
9. See Robert N. Clinton, Redressingthe Legacy of Conquest: A Vision Quest for a DecolonizedFederal
Indian Law, 46 Ark. L. Rev. 77 (1993) (taking the Constitution at its words and limiting congressional power
in Indian affairs to the regulation of commercial affairs with Indian tribes).
10. See Philip P. Frickey, Domesticating FederalIndian Law, 81 Minn. L. Rev. 31 (1996); Alex Tallchief
Skibine, Duro v. Reina and the Legislation that OverturnedIt: A Power Play of ConstitutionalDimensions,66
S. Cal. L. Rev. 767, 795-97 (1993).
11. In last year's Indian law symposium issue of this journal, T. Alexander Aleinikoff intimated as much.
See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Securing Tribal Sovereignty: A Theory for Overturning Lone Wolf, 38 Tulsa L.
Rev. 57, 57-58 (2002) (stating that "the trust doctrine arguably puts a burden on Congress to show that its
regulation of the tribes advances tribal interests").
12. Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations, 132 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 195, 232-33 (1984).
13. See Wood, supra n. 5, at 1508-13.
14. 448 U.S. 371 (1980).
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should be enforceable against Congress. Thus, while Professor Wood is right that the
association between plenary power and the trust doctrine was unfortunate, that was so
only because the trust doctrine used to be deployed to aggrandize-the power of Congress
beyond the Constitution. 15 Under my argument, the trust doctrine is being used to
aggrandize the power of Congress within constitutional boundaries; therefore, it can be
adequately controlled. Simply put, my argument is that the trust doctrine is now used to
enhance the normal power Congress possesses pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause.
However, there is a caveat. This enhanced power can only be used as long as it is
consistent with the trust relationship. This does not mean that Congress can never enact
legislation detrimental to tribal interests. It only means that when doing so, Congress has
to act pursuant to an un-enhanced commerce power. This means16that any legislation
detrimental to tribes has to have a substantial nexus with commerce.
I am neither the first nor the last scholar to have suggested a constitutional lineage
for the trust doctrine. 17 Carole Goldberg made her argument in the context of arguing
that even if the classification of "Indian" is not considered racial for the purpose of
imposing the strict scrutiny test, Indians should not fear being discriminated against
because Congress is prevented from doing so under the trust doctrine. 18 Stuart Minor
Benjamin argued that the trust doctrine was derived from the Indian Commerce Clause
and concluded that, as a result, the trust relationship could not be extended to Native
Hawaiians. 19 According to Professor Benjamin, this follows from the fact that there are
no Native Hawaiian Indian tribes and, under the clause, Congress only has the power to
regulate commerce with Indian tribes and not with individual Indians unaffiliated with
any tribe. 20 While these scholars have asserted that the trust doctrine is derived from the
Commerce Clause, they have not put forward comprehensive arguments why this is so.
This has allowed other scholars to put forth strong criticisms of that position. 2 1 The
central premise of my re-energized argument is that it is only by integrating the trust
doctrine into the Indian commerce power that the Court can conclude that the power of
Congress over Indian affairs is derived from the Indian Commerce Clause, while still
asserting that such power is "plenary" in that it reaches beyond the regulation of
"commerce" with Indian tribes. 22 This article, however, does not agree that the Indian

15. A result Wood correctly attributes to Kagama. See Wood, supran. 5, at 1502-05.
16. For a comprehensive argument describing what this commercial nexus should be, see Robert N.
Clinton, There Is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes, 34 Ariz. St. L.J. 113, 254 (2002) and T.
Alexander Aleinikoff, Semblances of Sovereignty: The Constitution, the State, and American Citizenship 13032 (Harv. U. Press 2002).
17. See Skibine, supran. 10, at 795; Stephen B. Young, Indian Tribal Sovereignty and American Fiduciary
Undertakings,8 Whittier L. Rev. 825, 858 (1987).
18. Carole E. Goldberg-Ambrose, Not "Strictly" Racial: A Response to "Indiansas Peoples", 39 UCLA L.
Rev. 169, 179 n. 54, 180-84 (1991).
19. See Stuart Minor Benjamin, Equal Protection and the Special Relationship: The Case of Native
Hawaiians,106 Yale L.J. 537 (1996).
20. Id. at 543-44 n. 28, 545 n. 36, 592 n. 217.
21. See L. Scott Gould, Tough Love for Tribes: Rethinking Sovereignty after Atkinson and Hicks, 37 New
Eng. L. Rev. 669 (2003); Gould, supra n. 8; David Williams, Sometimes Suspect: A Response to Professor
Goldberg-Ambrose, 39 UCLA L. Rev. 191, 201-03 (1991).
22. In Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, for instance, the Court stated that the "central function of the
Indian Commerce Clause is to provide Congress with plenary power to legislate in the field of Indian Affairs."
490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989).
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Commerce Clause gives Congress a truly "plenary"-meaning "absolute"-power over
Indian affairs. Instead, it argues that the integration of the trust doctrine into the
commerce power somewhat augmented that power beyond what a literal reading of the
Commerce Clause would normally suggest. In other words, there is a symbiotic
relationship between an expanded Indian commerce power and the trust doctrine.
Besides determining how the trust doctrine came to be integrated into the
Constitution and what this means for congressional power, there are two other related
important questions. First, are there any standards that allow the Court to determine
when Congress is acting pursuant to its role as trustee and when it is not? Second, are
there any meaningful limits to Congress's power under a regular commerce power unenhanced by the trust doctrine? Professor Wood has already convincingly put forth an
answer to the first of these questions, suggesting that any such legislation has to protect
tribal territories, protect tribal self-government, promote economic self-sufficiency, or
promote cultural preservation. 2 3 As to the second question, Professor Clinton has
recently written a comprehensive article delineating the power of Congress under the
Indian Commerce Clause. 24 Therefore, this article will primarily address itself to the
question of how the trust doctrine was integrated into the Constitution and what such
integration means for congressional power over Indian affairs.
A.

From John Marshallto Kagama: The Origin and Subsequent Perversionof the
Trust Doctrine.

Professor Wood has argued that the creation of the trust emerged fiom the huge
loss of land the tribes suffered at the hands of the European colonial powers and the
United States. 25 She also made a persuasive argument that John Marshall never
26
understood the trust doctrine as enlarging the power of Congress over Indian tribes.
Terming Marshall's version the "sovereign trust" branch of the doctrine, she contrasted it
with the "guardian-ward" branch, which she traced to the 1886 Supreme Court decision
in United States v. Kagama. According to Wood, under the "sovereign trust" branch, the
trust doctrine only aggrandized the power of Congress in order to protect the sovereignty
of the Indian nations. While Wood is correct in asserting that Chief Justice Marshall
never conceived of the trust doctrine as enlarging congressional power, this does not
mean that he believed the power of Congress in Indian affairs was not plenary. Thus,
Marshall is the one who actually described the relationship between the United States
and the tribes as akin to that of a ward to a guardian. 27 Furthermore, in describing the
status of Indian tribes as "domestic dependent nations,' 28 he analogized the relationship
to that of a vassal to his lord. 29 Marshall derived the status of the tribes from the course
of dealings between England and the tribes, the law of nations under which Indian tribes
23. See Mary Christina Wood, Protectingthe Attributes of Native Sovereignty: A New Trust Paradigm for
FederalActions Affecting Tribal Lands andResources, 1995 Utah L. Rev. 109, 132.
24. See Clinton, supra n. 16.
25. See Wood, supra n. 5, at 1495-96.
26. Id. at 1498-1501.
27. CherokeeNation v. Ga., 30 U.S. I, 17 (1831).
28. Id.
29. Worcesterv. Ga., 31 U.S. 515, 561 (1832).
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were subjected to the doctrine of discovery, and the fact that England and later the
United States had signed treaties with the Indian tribes. 30 Under such treaties, the tribes
acknowledged that they were under the protection of the United States, and they ceded
millions of acres of land to the United States. In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, Marshall
imported all of this context to hold that Indian tribes were neither states nor foreign
nations under the Constitution, and therefore could not file an original suit in the
Supreme Court. 3 1 However, as noted by Philip Frickey, this did not prevent John
Marshall from believing that Congress already had some sort of plenary power over
32
Indian affairs.
While I concur with Professor Frickey's assessment, I have argued elsewhere that
Justice Marshall conceived of the guardian-ward relationship in the Cherokee cases as an
antidote to the power he had awarded Congress in Johnson v. M'Intosh,33 where he took
the position that Indian tribes were subject to the doctrine of discovery. 34 In other
words, Marshall acknowledged that the doctrine of discovery allowed Congress plenary
authority in that it could decide to "conquer" the territories of the Indian nations.
However, he also believed that while at peace, the Indian nations were owed a duty of
protection. So, in effect, while Professor Wood is partially correct that the creation of
the trust had something to do with the huge land transfers which took place between the
tribes and the United States, the ultimate creation of the trust arose from the fact that
"Indian tribes"--the political entities existing in America before the coming of the
European powers-were subject to the doctrine of discovery. The type of "plenary
power" existing under the doctrine of discovery was the power to acquire the territory of
the tribes by purchase or conquest. Marshall acknowledged that the United States could
have conquered the tribes and assimilated the tribal members into the general
population. 35 That course of action, however, had not been taken. Instead, Indian tribes
had become domestic dependent nations under the protection of the United States.
The case most widely acknowledged as creating Congress's plenary power, not
only over Indian affairs but also over the affairs of the Indians, is Kagama. Although the
case is confusing and has been understood by some as relying exclusively on the trust
relationship to give Congress some extra-constitutional power, the opinion does not
mention the trust in connection with allowing Congress to interfere with the internal
affairs of tribes. 36 The trust is only mentioned in that part of the opinion which explains

30. For a summary of John Marshall's view, see Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present:
Colonialism, Constitutionalism,and Interpretationin FederalIndian Law, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 381 (1993) and
Alex Tallchief Skibine, Reconciling Federal and State Power inside Indian Reservations with the Right of
Tribal Self-Government and the Process ofSelf-Determination, 1995 Utah L. Rev. 1105, 1119-24.
31. 30 U.S. at 20.
32. Frickey, supra n. 10, at 59, 60, 68-69 (noting that both Marshall and the Kagama Court believed that
the power of Congress over Indian Affairs was "inherent" from the structure of the Constitution).
33. 21 U.S. 543 (1823).
34. Id. at 568-71; see Skibine, supra n. 30, at 1119-24.
35. See Worcester, 31 U.S. at 552-53.
36. Nor does the decision use the term "plenary" in connection with describing congressional power over
Indian tribes. See Stacy L. Leeds, The More Things Stay the Same: Waiting on Indian Law's Brown v. Board
of Education, 38 Tulsa L. Rev. 73, 77 (2002).
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why the legislation at issue was not a violation of state sovereignty. 37 In other words,
the Court held that the existence of a trust relationship justified congressional power to
preempt state jurisdiction even though the regulation had nothing to do with commerce.
Viewed that way, that conception of the trust is even consistent with Marshall's notion of
a trust enlarging the power of Congress to protect Indian tribes from outside forces.
As first explained by Dean Newton, the Kagama Court's real justification for
allowing Congress to interfere with internal aspects of tribal sovereignty seems to be the
concept that every sovereign has an inherent power to control its territory. 38 Other
scholars concurred. Professor Frickey has argued that in Kagama, the Court did not
derive the plenary power of Congress from the trust doctrine but from some inherent
sovereign power the United States has to control aliens both coming into and, in the case
of Indians, already "in" the country. 39 So, in effect, it is the fact that the United States is
the ultimate owner of the country where the Indians are, now residing that creates this
power.
Ultimately, the Kagama Court relied on the doctrine of discovery to justify
congressional power. This is why Kagama should no longer be good law to justify
congressional plenary power. Whether it is the power to conquer, wage war, or assert
power as a colonizer, that power should have disappeared after Indian tribes became
incorporated into the territory of the United States and tribal members became United
States citizens.
Perhaps realizing the ultimate correctness of that argument, the Court after
Kagama moved away from relying on any "inherent power" and instead adopted the trust
doctrine as the primary extra-constitutional grant of power to Congress to control Indian
affairs. Thus, in Sandoval, the Court was able to assert:
Not only does the Constitution expressly authorize Congress to regulate commerce with the
Indian tribes, but long continued legislative and executive usage and an unbroken current
of judicial decisions have attributed to the United States as a superior and civilized nation
the power and the duty of exercising a fostering care and protection over all dependent
Indian communities within its borders .... 41
While I agree with Professor Wood and others that Kagama is generally
considered to have used the trust to enlarge congressional power over Indian tribes by
focusing on the need to protect the Indians from themselves, I think that what
eventually came to distinguish the guardian-ward branch of the doctrine from Marshall's
"sovereign trust" version is its emphasis on protecting individual Indians. These
individuals needed protection for two reasons. First, the allotment policy's ultimate goal
was to separate individual Indians from their tribes by allotting tribal lands to individual

37. The issue in Kagama was whether Congress could enact legislation extending federal criminal
jurisdiction over Indians committing major crimes inside Indian reservations (Act of Mar. 3, 1885, 23 Stat. 362
(1885) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2000))). See 118 U.S. at 375-76.
38. Newton, supra n. 12, at 213-16.
39. See Frickey, supra n. 10, at 68-69.
40. The Kagama Court stated, "But these Indians are within the geographical limits of the United States.
The soil and the people within these limits are under the political control of the Government of the United
States .... " 118 U.S. at 379. "The right to govern may be the inevitable consequence of the right to acquire
Territory." Id. at 380.
41. 231 U.S. at 45-46.
42. See e.g. Wood, supra n. 5, at 1502-04.
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tribal members, thus undermining the tribal land base while integrating the individual
Indians into the larger society. 4 3 Second, because they were said to be from an inferior
race and an uncivilized culture, 44 they needed at first to be supervised by federal
governmental officials. Of course, these racist notions soon became unacceptable to
justify "plenary" power over Indians or their tribes; and, as noted by Dean Newton, even
before Mancari, the Court had eventually come to view the power of Congress as not
45
plenary.
B.

Morton v. Mancari and the Constitutionalizationof the Trust Doctrine

Mancari, nevertheless, did represent a turning point. The issue there was whether
a law giving preference in employment within the Bureau of Indian Affairs to members
of Indian tribes denied the equal protection of the law to non-Indians. After stating that
"[r]esolution of the instant issue turns on the unique legal status of Indian tribes under
federal law and upon the plenary power of Congress, based on a history of treaties and
the assumption of a 'guardian-ward' status, to legislate on behalf of federally recognized
Indian tribes," 46 the Court asserted that "[t]he plenary power of Congress to deal with
the special problems of Indians is drawn both explicitly and implicitly from the
Constitution itself."4 7 The Court then concluded that "[a]s long as the special treatment
[of Indians] can be tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress' unique obligation
toward the Indians, such legislative judgments will not be disturbed. 48
What I am suggesting here is that the Mancari Court integrated the trust doctrine
into the Constitution. Thus, before Mancari, both the plenary power and the trust
doctrine were creations of the federal common law. Mancari specifically stated that
although the plenary power was initially a product of treaties and the trust doctrine,
congressional power over Indian affairs was now thought to be derived from the Indian
Commerce power.4 9 Since the treaty power is no longer relevant and the power of
Congress is now solely derived from the Commerce Clause, can it still be plenary in the
sense of being absolute? The answer is no. If it was truly plenary, the Court should have
just stopped after its statement about plenary power and declared the preference valid.
But it did not do this. Instead, it went out of its way to first find that the classification of
"Indian" was not a racial classification but one based on political meibership in an
Indian tribe. 50 One would think that if the classification of Indian is not racial, the
rational basis test should automatically apply. However, the Court, in yet another
surprising turn, came up with a "rationally tied to the trust relationship" test, a test which
can be described as "rational basis plus." Next, the Court had to decide whether the

43. For a comprehensive overview of the allotment era, see Judith V. Royster, The Legacy ofAllotment, 27
Ariz. St. L.J. 1 (1995).
44. See US. v. Clapox, 35 F. 575, 577-78 (D. Or. 1888).
45. Newton, supra n. 12, at 230-31.
46. Mancari,417 U.S. at 551.
47. Id. at 551-52.
48. Id. at 555.
49. Id.at 552.
50. Id. at 553-54.
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that it was because
special treatment was rationally tied to the trust relationship and held
51
self-government.
tribal
protecting
of
goal
it promoted the non-racial
There are many criticisms one can level at Mancari. First, as some scholars have
52
is not based on race is suspect.
argued, the statement that the classification of Indians
Second, as many students in my federal Indian law class argue every time I teach the
case, why would encouraging Indians to join a federal agency with a colonial and
53
promoting tribal self-government?
paternalistic reputation have anything to do with
The Court's need to rely on such findings lead me to the following conclusions. First,
Congress's power is no longer absolute since it is now derived from the Commerce
Clause. Second, the classification of "Indian" is not racial only when it is tied to the trust
relationship. This means that it is not always "not racial." Third, promoting the federal
career of individual Indians is not, in and of itself, rationally tied to the trust relationship.
It is only tied to the trust when it promotes tribal self-government. This means that there
are limits to what is and what is not "rationally tied to the trust relationship."
If the power of Congress is no longer absolute, what are its limits? Does this mean
that, as some 54have argued, any congressional action towards Indians have to be tied to
"commerce"?
The overall conclusion I get from Mancari is that the trust doctrine is
somehow playing a role in both expanding and limiting the power of Congress under the
Commerce Clause. Congress can go beyond the normal definition of commerce but only
when it is acting pursuant to the trust. In other words, it is as if the Court had expanded
the definition of "commerce" under the Commerce Clause as encompassing
congressional action rationally tied to the trust. The next question is whether there are
any limitations to what can be viewed as rationally tied to the trust. In Mancari, the
special treatment of Indians had to be related to the promotion of tribal self-government.
55
In that
Mancari's ambiguities were next tested in United States v. Antelope.
by
committed
crimes
case, a federal criminal law imposed federal jurisdiction on certain
nona
tribal members. The problem was that if the same crime had been committed by
Indian, that individual would have been subjected to state jurisdiction, which would not
have punished the offender as severely as federal law would. The convicted tribal
member argued that this amounted to invidious racial discrimination. The tribal member
also argued that Mancari was inapplicable because that case dealt with laws benefiting
Indians, while the law under which he was prosecuted was detrimental to Indians. The
Court disagreed. After first stating that "classifications expressly singling out Indian
56
tribes as subject of legislation are expressly provided for in the Constitution," the Court
stated:
[T]he principles reaffirmed in Mancari... point more broadly to the conclusion that
federal regulation of Indian affairs is not based upon impermissible classifications. Rather,

51. Mancari,417 U.S. at 554.
52. See Gould, supra n. 8.
office
53. As one of my students asked, "Why would placing a Hopi in charge of the BIA Navajo regional
promote Navajo Tribal self-government?"
54. See Robert N. Clinton, Isolated in Their Own Country: A Defense of Federal Protection of Indian
Autonomy and Self-Government, 33 Stan. L. Rev. 979 (1981).
55. 430 U.S. 641 (1977).
56. Id.at 645.
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such regulation is rooted in the unique status of Indians as "a separate people" with their
own political institutions. Federal regulations of Indian tribes, therefore, is governance of
once-sovereign political communities; it is not to be viewed as legislation of a "'racial'
group consisting of 'Indians' ...,57
In other words, the Court in Antelope indicated that when the issue is governance
of Indian tribes inside Indian country, the separate treatment of tribal members can never
be a racial classification because the Constitution itself "expressly singles out" Indian
tribes for special treatment. Although the Antelope Court summarily concluded that
"Congress has undoubted constitutional power to prescribe a criminal code applicable in
Indian country,, 58 this cannot mean that Congress has "absolute" power to enact
anything it wants under the guise of such governance. Congress could not, for instance,
enact a law requiring Indians to sit in the back of the proverbial bus even when the bus is
being operated inside an Indian reservation.
The Court followed its Mancari decision with two other significant cases,
Delaware Tribal Business Committee v. Weeks 59 and United States v. Sioux Nation.
While Weeks is noteworthy for containing language overturning the political question
doctrine as relating to Indian affairs first enunciated in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock,60 Sioux
Nation made clear that the principle enunciated in Weeks went beyond cases alleging
violations of the Equal Protection Clause. The Court in Sioux Nation had to decide
whether the taking of the Black Hills from the Sioux by the United States was done
61
pursuant to the trust relationship or pursuant to Congress's power of eminent domain.
If done pursuant to the former, the Sioux were not owed just compensation within the
meaning of the Fifth Amendment. 6 2 Otherwise they were. While the Sioux Nation
Court acknowledged that Congress can act beyond normal constitutional restrictions if
acting as a trustee for the tribes, it also held that when Congress is not acting as a trustee,
63
such legislation should be subject to constitutional restrictions.

57. Id. at 646 (quoting Mancari,417 U.S. at 553 n. 24).
58. Id. at 648.
59. 430 U.S. 73 (1977).
60. The Weeks Court stated that "the power of Congress 'has always been deemed a political one,' ... [but
this] has not deterred this Court, particularly in this day, from scrutinizing Indian legislation to determine
whether it violates the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment." Id. at 84 (quoting Lone Wolf 187
U.S. at 565). For a perceptive analysis of the Lone Wolf decision and its ongoing legacy, see Joseph William
Singer, Lone Wolf, or How to Take Property by Calling It a "'MereChange in the Form of Investment", 38
Tulsa L. Rev. 37 (2002).
61. See 448 U.S. at 389-90.
62. This part of the decision has been severely criticized. See Nell Jessup Newton, The Judicial Role in
Fifth Amendment Takings of Indian Land: An Analysis of the Sioux Nation Rule, 61 Or. L. Rev. 245 (1982);
Singer, supra n. 60, at 38.
63. As the Court put it:
It is obvious that Congress cannot simultaneously (1)act as trustee for the benefit of the Indians,
exercising its plenary powers over the Indians and their property, as it thinks is in their best
interests, and (2) exercise its sovereign power of eminent domain, taking the Indians' property
within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. In any given situation in which
Congress has acted with regard to Indian people, it must have acted either in one capacity or the
other. Congress can own two hats, but it cannot wear them both at the same time.
448 U.S. at 408 (quoting Three Affiliated Tribes of the Ft. BertholdReservation v. U.S., 390 F.2d 686, 691 (Ct.
Cl. 1968)) (internal quotations omitted).
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The argument proposed in this article is that such reasoning should apply to limit
what Congress can do under the Commerce Clause. In other words, the Court in Sioux
Nation and Mancariheld that if Congress was not acting as a trustee for the tribes, the
Fifth Amendment would apply to congressional action so that both the Takings Clause
and the strict scrutiny test would become applicable. This article suggests that when
Congress is not acting as a trustee for the tribes, the "plenary" (meaning "enhanced")
form of the Indian Commerce Clause disappears, and Congress can only act within the
ordinary reach of the Commerce Clause. This means that congressional action must
somehow be tied to "commerce" with the Indian tribes.
There has been an incremental evolution in the Court's thinking on congressional
plenary power and how it interacts with the Indian trust doctrine. The Court in Mancari
integrated the trust doctrine into the Constitution. This integration allowed the Court to
take a broad view of the Indian commerce power and conclude that the power of
Congress was still "plenary." What I am arguing here is that to be consistent with its
own thinking in Mancariand Sioux Nation, the Court should acknowledge that since the
trust doctrine is what enlarges the power of Congress under the Indian commerce power,
the power is commensurably reduced when Congress is not acting as a trustee.
II.

A.

APPLICATION OF THE TRUST INTEGRATION DOCTRINE TO CURRENT ISSUES.

The Power of Congress to Interfere with Tribal Self-Government.

In Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians of Wisconsin v.
United States, 64 the Band argued that a provision in the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
(IGRA) 65 requiring a state governor to concur with the Secretary of the Interior before
land could be taken in trust for the Band for gaming purposes was a breach of trust
because it was not rationally related to the trust relationship. 66 The Band seemed to rely
on a previous case in which a federal district court held that IGRA did not amount to a
67
breach of trust, but at least considered the argument.
Describing the argument as a non-constitutional one, Chief Judge Crabb dismissed
the claim, holding that IGRA was not enacted pursuant to the trust relationship and that
the Mancari "rationally related to the trust" test had so far only been applied to
constitutional claims. 68 Chief Judge Crabb was wrong in terming the claim a nonconstitutional one. She is right that so far the Mancaritest has only been used to gauge
the legitimacy of acts of Congress when the allegation was that constitutional rights were
at stake, but, as explained in the previous section, the claim here should have been that if
Congress did not act pursuant to the trust relationship when it enacted IGRA, its power
should have been constrained by other provisions of the Constitution. The thesis of this
article is that it is only through the trust doctrine that the Indian commerce power is

64.
65.
66.
67.
740 F.
68.

259 F. Supp. 2d 783 (W.D. Wis. 2003).
Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (1988).
259 F. Supp. 2d at 786; see 25 U.S.C. § 2719(b)(1)(A) (2000).
See Lac Courte Oreilles, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 792-93; Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. Swimmer,
Supp. 9, 12-13 (D.D.C. 1990).
Lac Courte Oreilles, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 792.
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expanded beyond its strictly "commerce" aspect. The constitutional question in Lac
Courte Oreilles, therefore, should have been whether some sections in IGRA that were
not enacted pursuant to the trust relationship were unconstitutional in that they went
beyond the regulation of commerce. Of course, in the end, this argument may not have
helped the Lac Courte Oreilles Band since, even if enacted pursuant to its regular
commerce power, most of IGRA would still be constitutional since it obviously regulates
commerce with Indian tribes. To be sure, that was the case for the section the Band was
attacking, which regulated the acquisition of trust land outside Indian reservations for
gaming purposes.
The recent Supreme Court decision in United States v. Navajo Nation69 raises
somewhat related concerns. In that case, the Navajo Nation was arguing that it had a
breach of trust case against the United States under the Tucker Act because the Secretary
of the Interior had breached his trust duties when he approved a coal lease between the
Navajo Nation and Peabody Coal, a non-Indian energy corporation. 70 The Court held
that the Navajo Nation did not have a breach of trust case under the Tucker Act because
71
Congress had not provided any specific trust duties for the Secretary to undertake.
Although the Navajos were arguing that the Secretary's approval of the lease constituted
such a duty, the Court must have concluded that the approval power given to the
Secretary had not been enacted pursuant to the trust relationship. 72 Under this article's
thesis, if not given pursuant to the trust, Congress can only have the power to give such
approval authority if authorized to do so under an Indian commerce power un-enhanced
by the trust doctrine. Thus the question becomes: is the Secretary's approval of a coal
lease between a non-Indian corporation and the Navajo Nation related to "commerce
with the Indian tribes"? While the Secretary's approval power in this case is arguably

69. 537 U.S. 488 (2003).
70. Id. at 493.
71. Id.at 511-14. The outcome in Navajo Nation was controlled by the two Mitchell decisions: United
States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535 (1980) ("Mitchell F') and United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206 (1983)
("Mitchell11"). As explained by the Court in Navajo Nation:
To state a claim cognizable under the Indian Tucker Act, Mitchell I and Mitchell I thus instruct, a
tribe must identify a substantive source of law that establishes specific fiduciary or other duties, and
allege that the Government has failed faithfully to perform those duties. If that threshold is passed,
the court must then determine whether the relevant source of substantive law "can fairly be
interpreted as mandating compensation for damages sustained as a result of a breach of the duties
[the governing law] impose[s]."
537 U.S. at 506 (quoting Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 219) (citations omitted). According to the Court, the
difference between Mitchell I and Mitchell If was that the statutes invoked in Mitchell I "created only a limited
trust relationship between the United States and the allottee that does not impose any duty upon the
Government to manage timber resources," id. at 504 (quoting Mitchell 1, 445 U.S. at 542) (internal quotations
omitted), whereas "[iun Mitchell I1,
[the Court] held-that a network of other statutes and regulations did impose
judicially enforceable fiduciary duties upon the United.States in its management of forested allotted lands." Id.
at 504-05.
72. Thus, Justice Ginsburg, author of the Navajo Nation opinion, stated in United States v. White Mountain
Apache Tribe issued the same day as Navajo Nation:
The coal-leasing provisions of the IMLA and its allied regulations, Navajo explains, lacked the
characteristics that typify a genuine trust relationship: Those'provisions assigned the Secretary of
the Interior no managerial role over coal leasing; they did not even establish the 'limited trust
relationship' that existed under the law at issue in Mitchell L
537 U.S. at 480-81 (Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ.,
concurring).

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2003

11

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 39 [2003], Iss. 2, Art. 2
TULSA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 39:247

related to commerce, Indian tribes should nevertheless reevaluate all the various
approval requirements given to the Secretary when, as in the Navajo Nation case, the
approval power was apparently not given pursuant to the trust relationship.
Even if related to commerce, tribes should question the ultimate purpose of these
non-trust related approval requirements. In the case of the Navajos and their coal lease,
for instance, if the approval power was not enacted pursuant to the trust, why was the
Secretary given such authority? Was it to make sure the non-Indian energy corporations
got the best possible deal when signing leases with Indian tribes? If not related to the
trust, the purposes behind such approval requirements may be so obscure and bizarre that
they may be lacking any rational basis whatsoever. 73 As such, they could become
suspect on due process grounds since they impose a burden on tribal property interests.
B.

Congressas the Terminator: Can the Trustee End the Relationship?

One of the perennial judicial statements associated with any reaffirmation of
congressional plenary power is the customary quasi-genocidal canard that Congress can
terminate the trust relationship with individual tribes at will. 74 In this section I suggest
that any "plenary" authority to terminate the relationship has no constitutional foundation
and is derived solely from the former power to annihilate tribes by war or conquest. As
such, it is a remnant of a now defunct version of plenary power. Judicial statements
recognizing such power have their origins in the early 1900s, when Lone Wolf's political
question doctrine was still good law, 75 Kagama's trust doctrine was perceived to be the
source of an extra-constitutional plenary power, 76 and the trust relationship was thought
to be necessary to protect Indians not because they were members of dependent
sovereigns but because they belonged to an inferior race. 77 No one can seriously argue
that these principles are still in effect today to justify such a congressional prerogative.
Inasmuch as this article has argued that both the power of Congress and the trust doctrine
have now been integrated in the Constitution, Congress should no longer be able to
terminate the trust relationship at will unless a tribe no longer exists or such termination
is found to be for the benefit of the tribe. I can only conceive of two scenarios where this

73. The Court, in Navajo Nation, acknowledged that the Indian Mineral Leasing Act
was designed "to provide Indian tribes with a profitable source of revenue." [Cotton Petroleum,
490 U.S. at 179.] But Congress had as a concrete objective in that regard the removal of certain
impediments that had applied particularly to mineral leases on Indian land. See Cotton [Petroleum],
490 U.S., at 179 ("Congress was... concerned... with matters such as the unavailability of
extralateral mineral rights on Indian land.") ....
537 U.S. at 511-12 n. 16.
74. Perhaps the earliest statement to that effect was made in Sandoval, where the Court, referring to the
Pueblos in New Mexico, stated, "[Tihe questions whether, to what extent, and for what time they shall be
recognized and dealt with as dependent tribes requiring the guardianship and protection of the United States are
to be determined by Congress, and not by the courts." 231 U.S. at 46.
75. See Lone Wolf 187 U.S. at 565 ("Plenary authority over the tribal relations of the Indians has been
exercised by Congress from the beginning, and the power has always been deemed a political one, not subject
to be controlled by the judicial department of the government.").
76. Supra nn. 36-40 and accompanying text.
77. See Clapox, 35 F. at 577 (stating that an Indian reservation is "in the nature of a school, and the Indians
are gathered there, under the charge of an agent, for the purpose of acquiring the habits, ideas, and aspirations
which distinguish the civilized from the uncivilized man").
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might be the case: (1) the tribe has consented, or (2) the termination of the relationship
means that the tribe is no longer a dependent sovereign subject of the doctrine of
discovery, but has become a fully independent nation. The following two cases highlight
problems arising when termination or lack of recognition of Indian tribes is treated as a
political question and shielded from judicial review.
In Kahawaiolaa v. Norton,78 a district court upheld the Secretary of Interior's
decision to prevent a Native Hawaiian group from petitioning the BIA for
acknowledgment as an Indian tribe. 79 The argument of the Native Hawaiians was that
Congress had delegated the responsibility for acknowledging tribes to the Secretary
under Title 25 United States Code Section 2, and that the Secretary denied Native
Hawaiians the equal protection of the law when she prevented them from applying for
recognition. 80 Although the petitioners in Kahawaiolaa were not actually challenging
any acts of Congress-they were challenging a decision by the Secretary to exclude them
from the federal acknowledgment process-the judge in the case somehow decided to
treat the case as one where the Secretary's decision to refuse to consider the application
of the Hawaiian group had been directed by Congress. 8 1 As such, the court held that this
decision not reviewable by the judicial branch under
congressional action was a political
82
the political question doctrine.
Although not crystal clear from the opinion, properly conceptualized, the case was
really about deciding whether the BIA had misconstrued its authority when it took the
position that Congress had "precluded" agency consideration of any and all petitions
from Hawaiian groups. While pretending not to decide the issue, 83 the court clearly
implied that the agency had properly construed its authority since it found that "the
challenged regulations do no more than effectuate congressional policy with respect to
Native Hawaiians in the sense that Congress has not, as of yet, decided to enter a
government-to-government relationship. ' 84 The problem with this statement is that the
same thing could have been said for all the other recently acknowledged tribes.
Obviously, Congress has not yet decided whether to treat Native Hawaiians as a tribe. If

78. 222 F. Supp. 2d 1213 (D.Haw. 2002).
79. Id.at 1223; see 25 C.F.R. § 83.3(a) (1998) (restricting application "to those American Indian groups
indigenous to the continental United States"). For a recent analysis of the BIA recognition process, see Mark
D. Myers, Student Author, Federal Recognition of Indian Tribes in the United States, 12 Stan. L. & Policy
Rev. 271 (2001).
80. Kahawaiolaa,222 F. Supp. 2d at 1217-19; see 25 U.S.C. § 2. Section 2, first enacted in 1832, states,
"The Commissioner of Indian Affairs shall, under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior, and agreeably to
such regulations as the President may prescribe, have the management of all Indian affairs and of all matters
arising out of Indian relations." Although the Supreme Court has not used the non-delegation doctrine to strike
an act of Congress since the 1930s, see e.g. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Assns., Inc., 531 U.S. 457 (2001), the
sheer breadth of § 2 is unusual, even in an age of broad delegation. It seems to be the mother of all delegation.
Even though it may have been constitutional at a time when the President was signing treaties with
Indian tribes and "Indian affairs" had a status similar to foreign affairs, the statute should be vulnerable on nondelegation grounds after the integration of Indian tribes into the United States political system and the
acquisition of U.S. citizenship by tribal members.
81. Kahawaiolaa,222 F. Supp. 2d at 1219.
82. Id.
83. Thus the court stated, "[T]he Court finds that Plaintiffs' case raises a nonjusticiable political question
because their challenge to the regulations surrounding tribal recognition involves matters that have been
I
constitutionally committed to the other branches .... Id.
84. Id. at 1220-21.
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it had decided either way, the group would not be petitioning the BIA for recognition.
The court totally misunderstood the role of the recognition process when it stated that
"the regulations that Plaintiffs challenge only pertain to those groups with whom
Congress has established government-to-government relations." 85 Exactly the opposite
is true. A group with whom Congress had established a government-to-government
relationship would never bother petitioning for acknowledgment. It would not need to.
Acknowledgment is only necessary to Indian tribes that are currently lacking an official
government-to-government relationship with the United States.
The court's true reasoning therefore seems to hinge on the fact that unlike all the
other petitioning tribes, the lack of recognition of Native Hawaiians as a tribe comes
from an intentional decision by Congress "not to decide" the status of Native Hawaiians
as a tribe. I believe that it was a mistake for the court to derive from this "decision not to
decide" a congressional decision to prevent the BIA from considering such a petition for
recognition as a tribe. If Congress had in fact intended to preclude Native Hawaiians
from filing a petition, that decision perhaps could have been viewed as a political
question. But Congress did no such thing. The case is therefore not about a political
"decision" by Congress; it is really about whether Congress intended to preclude judicial
review of the Secretary's decision to prevent Native Hawaiians from applying for
recognition, even if such preclusion amounted to racial discrimination. As such, the
issue is clearly subject to judicial review. The court should have first focused on
whether Congress intended to preclude judicial review of a constitutional issue. If the
answer was yes, the court should have next decided whether Congress can
constitutionally preclude such review because it amounts to delegating to an agency a
power Congress does not have: the power to deny certain individuals or groups their
constitutional rights. This is one of the most contentious questions in the field of
administrative law. 86 Perhaps here lies the true reason why the court decided not to
confront this issue and hide behind the political question doctrine.
In doing so, the court avoided one contentious issue but ended up raising another:
whether a congressional decision to terminate recognition or even refuse to recognize a
legitimate entity as an Indian tribe should really be shielded from judicial review by the
political question doctrine. This use of the political question doctrine in the field of
federal Indian law is puzzling since the use of the doctrine to shield congressional action
in Indian affairs from judicial review of constitutional questions was repudiated when the
Supreme Court, in Weeks, overruled that part of Lone Wolf in 1977.87
Surely a congressional decision to recognize a group as an Indian tribe must have
some limits. For instance, what if Congress recognized as an Indian tribe a group of
people claiming to be descendants of a Viking tribe and created a reservation for this
tribe? I do not believe that a court would refuse, on account of the political question
doctrine, to hear a complaint filed by a state that had lost some jurisdiction and a
85. Id. at 1220.
86. See e.g. Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988).
87. Weeks, 430 U.S. at 83-84 ("[T]he power of Congress 'has always been deemed a political one', .. . [but
this] has not deterred this Court, particularly in this day, from scrutinizing Indian legislation to determine
whether it violates the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment." (quoting Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at
565) (citations omitted)).
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88
The
substantial amount of tax revenue as a result of the creation of such reservation.
it
stated:
where
in
Sandoval,
Supreme Court seemed to agree

Of course, it is not meant by this that Congress may bring a community or body of
people within the range of this power by arbitrarily calling them an Indian tribe, but only
that in respect of distinctly Indian communities the questions whether, to what extent, and
for what time they shall be recognized and dealt with as dependent tribes requiring the
protection of the United States are to be determined by Congress, and not
guardianship and
89
courts.
the
by
But if recognition is no longer a political question, would the same thing be true if
Congress, on a whim, enacted a law to no longer recognize an Indian tribe or, as in the
case of the Native Hawaiians, prevented the executive branch from recognizing them?
It seems that courts shielding such executive or legislative decisions from judicial
review by way of the political question doctrine amounts togranting the United States, as
the trustee, the power to commit a form of non-violent "political" genocide on some of
its beneficiaries. Although the Court of Claims has stated that "[t]he Termination Act
did not abolish the tribe or its membership. It merely terminated Federal supervision
over and responsibility for the property and members of the tribe," 90 and the Seventh
Circuit recently added that the survival of a tribe "in some sovereign capacity after the
Termination Act is an un-controversial proposition, ' 9 1 any recognized sovereign
capacity would seem to only exist in a relationship between a state or other Indian tribes
and not the United States-unless, of course, the United States would allow Indian tribes
to carry on international relations on a nation-to-nation basis with foreign nations. But
because this is not about to happen, the use of the political question doctrine in such
92
It
termination cases can only be justified as an extension of the right of conquest.
93
dicta
containing
Posner
A recent opinion by Judge
should no longer be legitimate.
supporting the use of the doctrine in such cases highlights the falsity of the premise.
In Miami Nation of Indians of Indiana, Inc. v. United States Department of the
Interior,94 Judge Posner remarked that the decision to recognize a tribe is usually a
95
political question, and he gave two examples to illustrate his point. First, he relied on
Luther v. Borden,96 a case where the Supreme Court refused to recognize which of two
88. Although this hypothetical is unlikely to arise since, if anything, Congress has usually been reluctant to
grant tribal status, the relatively recent recognition of the Mashantucket Pequot tribe has raised such issues.
See 25 U.S.C. § 1758; Jeff Benedict, Without Reservation: How a ControversialIndian Tribe Rose to Power
and Built the World's Largest Casino (HarperCollins 2001) (arguing that the Mashantucket Pequots would
have never been able to meet the criteria for tribal recognition established by the Bureau of Acknowledgment
and Research had they filed a petition for recognition instead of obtaining recognition directly from the
Congress).
89. 231 U.S. at 46.
90. Menominee Tribe of Indians v. U.S., 388 F.2d 998, 1000 (Ct. Cl. 1967) (emphasis omitted).
91. US. v. Long, 324 F.3d 475, 481 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S.Ct. 151 (2003).
92. The right to "conquer" Indian tribes is derived from the doctrine of discovery. For a critical look at the
doctrine, see Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Algebra of FederalIndian Law: The Hard Trail of Decolonizingand
Americanizing the White Man's Indian Jurisprudence,1986 Wis. L. Rev. 219, 252-58.
93. See Myers, supra n. 79, at 276 ("There is no legitimate foundation for denying Indian identification to
any tribe or community.").
94. 255 F.3d 342 (7th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1129 (2002).
95. Id.at 346-47.
96. 48 U.S. 1(1849).
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governments was the legitimate government of Rhode Island. 97 Second, he asserted that
"if the residents of what was once the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies asked a federal court
to recognize it as an independent nation, the court would invoke Luther v. Borden and
tell them to take up the matter with the State Department.' '9 8 These two situations,
however, are not similar to recognizing the existence of an Indian tribe. In the Rhode
Island case, the issue was the legitimacy of a state government, not the very existence of
the state of Rhode Island. This is more similar to a case where the BIA refused to
recognize the legitimacy of a given tribal government, which is a different issue than
refusing to acknowledge the existence of a tribe. In the Two Sicilies case, the United
States is not recognizing the existence of an independent Kingdom because it has already
acknowledged that the government of Italy is the legitimate sovereign over the former
Kingdom. Even if a case involving the recognition of Italy as a sovereign entity is a
political question, what sets such a case apart is that it involves relations with "foreign"
states with whom the United States does not have a trust relationship. Because Indian
tribes are no longer foreign nations but domestic dependent nations with whom the
United States has a trust relationship, Congress, as a trustee, should no longer be able to
ignore some of its beneficiaries.
This article has argued that the power of Congress over Indian affairs is derived
from the Indian commerce power enhanced by a constitutionally integrated trust
doctrine. While Congress can refuse to recognize the legitimacy of a tribal government,
it should not be able to ignore the existence of a legitimate Indian tribe. If Congress does
not act as a trustee, according to the thesis of this article, Congress is limited to
regulating commerce with Indian tribes. Failure to recognize a legitimate tribe, or
terminating an existing tribe, is not part of commerce, no matter how broadly defined.
Because the Constitution acknowledges that there are such political entities as Indian
tribes, Congress cannot pretend that there never were any tribes. Congress could have
decided to abolish the tribes by conquest and kill all the tribal members through war.
Because neither "conquest" nor "war" is a legitimate tool for a government to use against
its own citizens, Congress can no more "terminate" tribes than it can "exterminate" tribal
members. It can determine that an entity is no longer a tribe or never was a tribe, but that
finding should not be shielded from judicial review by the political question doctrine.
Courts have as much expertise as Congress or the BIA in determining whether an entity
qualifies as a legitimate Indian tribe for the purposes of the Indian Commerce Clause.
C.

The Power of Congress to Reaffirm Inherent TribalPowers.

Another recent case highlighting the relationship between the trust doctrine and
plenary power is United States v. Lara.99 The issue there was whether Congress could
reaffirm the inherent power of Indian tribes to prosecute non-member Indians after the

97. MiamiNation, 255 F.3d at 347.
98. Id.
99. 324 F.3d 635 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc), cert. granted,124 S. Ct. 46 (2003).
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Supreme 1Court, in Duro v. Reina,100 held that tribes had been implicitly divested of such
10
power.
The majority of the Eighth Circuit determined that the so-called "Duro Fix"
legislation could not be a reaffirmation of inherent tribal power, but instead had to be a
delegation of congressional authority to the tribe. 102 The majority of the court held that
Congress could not reaffirm such power because Duro was not a decision based on
federal common law. Instead, it concluded that "the distinction between a tribe's
inherent and delegated powers is of constitutional magnitude and therefore is a matter
Once the federal sovereign divests a tribe
ultimately entrusted to the Supreme Court ....
10 3
of a particular power.., it may only be restored by delegation of Congress's power."
Except for quoting language from a previous opinion, 104 the Eighth Circuit's opinion is
almost completely denuded of any further explanation supporting its assertion. 10 5 The
court did assert that while Congress might have been able to reaffirm such inherent tribal
power when its power was derived from the trust doctrine, it could no longer do so now
that "Congress's broad authority over Indian affairs derives from and is limited by the
Constitution." 10 6 Thus, the Lara court concluded that "[i]n exercising its commerce
a constitutional decision by simply rewriting the
power, Congress may not 'override
' 10 7
history upon which it is based." '
In Part I of this article, I have argued that both the plenary power of Congress and
the trust doctrine have been integrated into the Indian Commerce Clause. The question
worth exploring here is whether the conclusions reached in Part I of this article somehow
support the position reached by the Lara majority. The dissenting opinion in Lara took
strong exception to the argument that because the power of Congress was now said to be
located in the Constitution, Congress could not restore inherent sovereignty to the tribe.
Thus the dissent stated:
The source of Congress's plenary power is in any case beside the point: Regardless of
its source, it is well settled that Congress's power is plenary. It is a non sequitur to
intimate that because the source of the plenary power may have changed from a "non-

100. 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
101. 324 F.3d at 638. Congress reaffirmed this inherent tribal power when it amended the definition of tribal
self-government contained in the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2), to include "the inherent power
of Indian tribes, hereby recognized and affirmed, to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians."
102. Lara, 324 F.3d at 639-40. In so holding, the Eighth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion as the one
adopted by the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Enas, 255 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc), cert. denied,534
U.S. 1115 (2002). For a discussion of Enas, see Alex Tallchief Skibine, Making Sense out of-Nevada v. Hicks:
A Reinterpretation, 14 St. Thomas L. Rev. 347, 362-68 (2001).
103. Lara, 324 F.3d at 639.
104. See U.S. v. Weaselhead, 156 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 1998), affid by an evenly divided court, 165 F.3d 1209
(8th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
105. In Weaselhead, after stating that "a legislative enactment purporting to recast history in a manner that
alters the-Supreme Court's stated understanding of the organizing principles by which the Indian tribes were
incorporated into our constitutional system of government," 156 F.3d at 823, the Eighth Circuit held that
"ascertainment of first principles regarding the position of Indian tribes within our constitutional structure of
government is a matter ultimately entrusted to the Court and thus beyond the scope of Congress's authority to
alter retroactively by legislative fiat." Id. at 824.
106. Lara, 324 F.3d at 639.
107. Id. at 640 (quoting Enas, 255 F.3d at 675).
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constitutional" to a constitutional source, Congress's ability to legislate is somehow
108
circumscribed.

Although, as explained in Part I, one of the purposes of this article is to
demonstrate the falsity of the part of that statement asserting that congressional power is
still plenary, I believe that the result reached by the dissent is nevertheless correct. In
other words, one can take a diminished view of plenary power and still conclude that
Congress has the authority to reaffirm inherent tribal powers even the Supreme Court has
held that such powers are implicitly divested.
Ultimately, the question in Lara comes down to determining whether Duro was a
constitutional decision. It seems that Duro can only be seen as a constitutional decision
if there is something in the Constitution that "divests" tribes of inherent sovereignty.
Although not sufficiently fleshed out by the Lara majority, properly understood, its
position must be that it is the very description of aboriginal nations as "Indian tribes"
within the Constitution that divests them of full sovereignty because such term implies a
trust relationship subjecting tribes to the plenary power of Congress pursuant to the
Indian Commerce Clause. As such, tribes can no longer exercise certain inherent powers
without being authorized to do so by Congress, and this authorization can only come
through delegation once such powers have been held to have been divested by the
Supreme Court.
My argument-that the Court has abandoned the notion of an extra-constitutional
plenary power but has justified an expanded notion of congressional power pursuant to
the Indian commerce power by integrating the trust doctrine into the Constitution--does
not address itself to any implicit limitations on inherent tribal powers. The Constitution
no more divests than vests inherent sovereign powers on Indian tribes. 10 9 As stated by
the Lara dissent in answering the majority's argument, "Even if the mere existence of
the Indian commerce clause somehow restricted the powers that tribes inherently
possess, moreover, inherent tribal sovereignty would still be a matter of federal common
law." 10 To prove this point, the dissent drew an analogy to the court striking a state law
as being in violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause. Congress can, by legislation,
authorize the state to re-enact the stricken legislation without such new state action being
undertaken pursuant to a "delegation" of federal authority. I l l Similarly, Congress can
authorize the tribes to re-assume the exercise of a judicially pre-empted inherent power.
The inherent limitations on tribal power, therefore, do not come from the status of
tribes within the Constitution, but from being described by the Court as domestic
dependent nations having a trust relationship with the United States. At the center of this
debate are the reasons for "domestic dependent status." The question is: why were the
tribes downgraded from full international sovereigns to domestic dependent nations?

108. Id. at 645 (Arnold, Bowman, Murphy & Smith, JJ., dissenting).
109. Although as I have argued elsewhere, by recognizing the existence of political entities known as Indian
tribes and vesting in Congress the power to regulate commerce with them, the Constitution implicitly
recognizes that these entities must have some measure of self-government. See Alex Tallchief Skibine, The
Dialogic of Federalism in Federal Indian Law and the Rehnquist Court: The Need for Coherence and
Integration,8 Tex. Forum Civ. Libs. & Civ. Rights 1 (2003).
110. 324 F.3d at 645 (Arnold, Bowman, Murphy & Smith, JJ., dissenting).
Ill. Id.
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The dissent's argument is that although John Marshall, in Cherokee Nation, used the
juxtaposition of Indian tribes, foreign nations, and states in the Commerce Clause to
confirm that Indian tribes were neither states nor foreign nations, this juxtaposition
within the constitutional text said nothing about the inherent powers of Indian tribes.
Thus, the dissent argued that the status of tribes was initially derived from the application
of the doctrine of discovery to the tribes. 112 Under the doctrine, "discovery gave title [to
all Indian lands] to the government by whose subjects, or by whose authority, it was
made, against all other European governments, which title might be consummated by
possession." 113 The doctrine, therefore, gave the discovering nation the exclusive right
to acquire tribal territories either by purchase or conquest. The doctrine, however, has its
114
roots in international, not constitutional, law.
In effect, Congress, in the "Duro Fix," did not tell the Court that Indian tribes were
not dependent domestic nations. It only stated that, contrary to the Court's view, this
domestic dependent status and the existence of a trust relationship no longer implied that
tribes were divested of the inherent power to prosecute non-member Indians. This
conclusion must have been based on an unstated congressional finding that such tribal
jurisdiction was no longer in conflict with the overriding sovereign interests of the
United States.
D.

Can the Trust RelationshipBe Extended to IndividualIndians?

Questions concerning whether the trust can be extended to individual Indians have
been raised in two interrelated contexts. The first one is whether Congress can use its
Indian commerce power to regulate individual Indians who are unaffiliated with any
Indian tribes. The second one is whether Congress can extend its commerce power to
confer preferences or disadvantages upon members of federally recognized Indian tribes
in a non-tribal context.
Issues surrounding the first question are well illustrated by the difference between
Justice Stevens's dissent and Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in Rice v. Cayetano.115
First, Justice Kennedy held that the State of Hawaii's qualification for an election to
select trustees to the Office of Hawaiian Affairs that restricted voting to Native
Hawaiians was based on race because "[a]ncestry can be a proxy for race. It is that
proxy here."' 1 16 Second, the majority held that even if the Native Hawaiians were a tribe,
"Congress may not authorize a State to create a voting scheme of this sort," 1 17 because
the election was not a tribal election for tribal office, but a state election for a state

112. Id. at 642 ("Chief Justice Marshall justified federal power over Indian tribes in terms of the right of
discovery, a euphemism for the right of conquest.").
113. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. at573.
114. Lara, 324 F.3d at 643 (Arnold, Bowman, Murphy & Smith, JJ., dissenting). Earlier, the dissent relied
on Professor Frickey's argument that "the Supreme Court in the Marshall trilogy embraced pre-constitutional
notions of the colonial process, rooted in the law of nations, involving both inherent tribal sovereignty and a
colonial prerogative vested exclusively in the central government." Id. at 642 (quoting Frickey, supra n. 10, at
57) (internal quotations omitted).
115. 528 U.S. 495 (2000).
116. Id.at514.
117. Id.at519.
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As such, the voting restrictions were in violation of the Fifteenth
119

Justice Stevens, in dissent, summarized the majority as having held that the voting
scheme was unconstitutional first because
Congress' trust-based power is confined to dealings with tribes, not with individuals, and
no tribe or indigenous sovereign entity is found among the native Hawaiians. Second, the
elections are "elections of the State," not of a tribe, and upholding this law would be "to
permit a State, by racial classification, to fence out whole classes of citizens .... .120
Stevens's summary of the majority's rationale implies that had the majority found that
Native Hawaiians constituted an Indian tribe, it would not have held that ancestry was a
proxy for race in this case. Stevens believed, however, that the majority took the wrong
approach because the question of whether a tribe existed or not should have been
irrelevant. The important issue was the existence of a trust relationship, and, according
to Stevens, Congress can have a trust relationship with individuals even if there is no
tribe. 12 1 Thus, he believed that a trust relationship had been created with the Native
Hawaiian people because
[t]he descendants of the native Hawaiians share with the descendants of the Native
Americans on the mainland or in the Aleutian Islands not only a history of subjugation at
the hands of colonial forces, but also a purposefully created
and specialized "guardian12 2
ward" relationship with the Government of the United States.
Long before Rice was even filed or argued before the Supreme Court, Professor
Benjamin predicted the result of such a case when he suggested that since the trust
relationship was derived from the Indian Commerce Clause and since the clause is
written in terms of allowing Congress to regulate commerce with "Indian tribes," the
clause could not justify special treatment for Native Hawaiians in the absence of a Native
Hawaiian Indian tribe. 123 In other words, according to Professor Benjamin, the trust
relationship is with Indian tribes, not individual Indians. The thesis proposed in this
article supports the part of Professor Benjamin's argument that the trust doctrine cannot
extend to individual Indians not associated with a tribe. Thus, since both the power of
Congress and the trust doctrine have been integrated into the Constitution and are now
considered derived from the Indian Commerce Clause, it follows that Congress can only
extend the trust relationship in connection with regulating commerce with Indian tribes.
This should not be taken as an indication that I agree with Professor Benjamin's
ultimate premise that there is no Native Hawaiian Indian tribe. However, because I do
not believe that the trust relationship can be extended to individual Indians unaffiliated
with tribes, I would have slightly altered Justice Stevens's argument in Rice by adding
that while the United States does not currently recognize any tribal government

118. Id.
119. Id.at 524.
120. Rice, 528 U.S. at 534 (Stevens & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting) (quoting id. at 522 (majority)) (citation

omitted).
121. Id.
at 535.
122. Id. at 534.
123. Benjamin, supra n. 19.
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representing all Native Hawaiians, that fact alone does not mean that the Native
Hawaiians are not an Indian tribe for the purpose of coming under the congressional
Indian commerce power. 124 Simply put, the very reason that Native Hawaiians do not
have a Native Hawaiian government is that the United States destroyed it. 125 Although
the United States stopped recognizing the national Hawaiian leadership, this does not
mean that Congress stopped looking at Native Hawaiians as a conquered people. There
are many instances throughout history where the United States actively sought to
capture, kill, or otherwise destroy tribal leaders and tribal governments. 126 The fact that
the United States was successful in many of these instances does not mean that those
suddenly leaderless tribes ceased to be recognized as Indian tribes. What makes a tribe
an "Indian" tribe for the purpose of the trust relationship and the Indian Commerce
Clause is that the tribe has been subjected to the doctrine of discovery, which brings
about a trust relationship with the United States. As late as 1955, the Alaskan Indians, in
the notorious Tee-Hit-Ton v. United States 127 case, were held to come under the doctrine
of discovery. This meant that the United States could take their property without giving
them just compensation. 128 There is no doubt in my mind that faced with a similar claim
from a Native Hawaiian group, the Tee-Hit-Ton Court would have held that such group
also came under the doctrine of discovery and should not be compensated.
The next issue concerns the power of Congress to enact special legislation for
members of federally recognized Indian tribes outside a tribal context. The recent case
12 9
of American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO v. United States
brought this issue sharply into focus. The plaintiffs in American Federation alleged that
a program granting a special exemption to Native American-owned firms doing business
with the Air Force constituted a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 130 The issue
was whether such special treatment should be subject to strict scrutiny because it
amounted to discrimination based on race. 13 1 The D.C. Circuit agreed that to the extent
the exemption was given to Native American-owned firms or even firms owned by tribal
members, it would raise serious constitutional concerns. 132 The court therefore decided
to treat the case as one giving preference only to tribally owned businesses. As such, the
court held that the classification was not based on race but was made on political

124. See Jt. Tribal Council of the Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d 370, 376-77 (1st Cir. 1975)
(holding that the Indian Trade and Non-Intercourse Act was applicable to any tribe, even those not officially
recognized by the federal government).
125. Thus the majority stated that "with the active assistance of John Stevens, the United States Minister to
Hawaii, acting with United States Armed Forces, replaced the monarchy with a provisional government." Rice,
528 U.S. at 505.
126. For instance, in 1900, the Bureau of Indian Affairs dismissed the government of the Osage Tribe and
suspended the Osage tribal constitution. See Logan v. Andrus, 457 F. Supp. 1318 (N.D. Okla. 1978). Other
tribes have been similarly treated. See Hario v. Kleppe, 420 F. Supp. 1110 (D.D.C. 1976) (doing essentially
the same thing to the Creek Nation); see generally John Tebbel & Keith Jennison, The American Indian Wars
(Bonanza Bks. 1960).
127. 348 U.S. 272 (1955).
128. Id. at 290-91.
129. 330 F.3d 513 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 957 (2003).
130. Id. at 516-17.
131. Seeid. at521.
132. Id. at 519-20.
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grounds.133 The applicable test, therefore, was Mancari's"rationally related to the trust
relationship" test, and the court was able to find the special exemption constitutional
34
because it was related to the non-racial goal of fostering tribal economic development. 1
The court acknowledged that the preference given there extended beyond
Mancari's confines in that it was not limited to programs solely benefiting Indians or
Indian reservations. 1 35 At the same time, the court noted that the preference was also
narrower than the one in Mancari since it was only given to tribally owned firms. The
court was therefore able to conclude that "[t]he critical consideration is Congress' power
to regulate commerce 'with the Indian tribes.' While Congress may use this power to
regulate tribal members, regulation of commerce with tribes is at the heart of the Clause,
136
particularly when the tribal commerce is with the federal government .... ,
The case squarely raised the issue of how far the reach of Mancari can be extended
to transform what would otherwise be classifications based on race to ones made along
political lines. The issue is important because without Mancari, such classifications
would be subject to the strict scrutiny test instead of the rationally related to the trust
relationship test. 137 Although one could take the broad view and argue that Mancariis
applicable whenever the government enacts a law for the benefit of Indians-because if
it is to their "benefit," it must have been enacted pursuant to the trust relationship---that
answer is too facile and circuitous. In other words, it ignores that Congress's power to
use the trust doctrine to boost its regular commerce power may be limited.
Notions that Mancari's reach may have some inherent limitations were first
proposed by David Williams, who argued that the strict scrutiny test should apply to all
laws treating Indians differently unless such laws were enacted to protect Indians as
"separate peoples" living inside Indian reservations. 138 In effect, Professor Williams
argued that if the legislation was not enacted for these purposes, the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments trumped the Indian Commerce Clause. Professor Goldberg responded that
even though Indians were thought not to come under these amendments at the time of
their adoption because Indians were not yet United States citizens considered to be under
the political jurisdiction of the federal government, 139 Indians certainly are citizens now,
and the Court is therefore not about to adopt Williams's thesis. 140 According to
Goldberg, a much simpler and cleaner argument for allowing Congress to treat Indians
differently is that Indian tribes were singled out for special treatment in the Commerce
Clause. Since the very mention of ."Indian tribes" in the Constitution has racial

133. Id. at 521.
134. Am. Fedn., 330 F.3d at 522-23.
135. Id. at 521.
136. Id. (citation omitted).
137. See Wayne R. Farnsworth, Student Author, Bureau of Indian Affairs Hiring Preferences after Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 1996 BYU L. Rev. 503; Frank Shockey, "Invidious" American Indian Tribal
Sovereignty: Morton v. Mancari Contra Adarand Constructors, Inc., v. Pena, Rice v. Cayetano, and Other
Recent Cases, 25 Am. Indian L. Rev. 275 (2000-2001).
138. David C. Williams, The Borders of the Equal Protection Clause: Indians as Peoples, 38 UCLA L. Rev.
759(1991).
139. See Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 109 (1884).
140. Goldberg-Ambrose, supra n. 18.
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connotations, 14 1 it implicitly allows Congress to treat Indians differently without such
legislation being attacked as racial discrimination under the Fifth or Fourteenth
Amendments. 14 2 Professor Williams countered Professor Goldberg's theory by arguing
that it goes too far in that it would also allow Congress to enact laws that are detrimental
to Indians. 143 Although Professor Goldberg had argued that the trust relationship
imposed some limits on Congress's ability to enact laws discriminating against Indians,
disposed to use the
Williams asserted that history has shown that courts have not been
44
trust relationship to impose constraints on congressional power. 1
In her last effort to date on this issue, Professor Goldberg acknowledged that her
Commerce Clause argument was vulnerable to arguments such as those raised by
Professor Benjamin that the Commerce Clause only purports to authorize Congress to
regulate Indian tribes and not individual Indians. 145 However, she countered that as long
as legislation benefiting individual Indians had a nexus with tribal interests, it should still
be evaluated pursuant to Mancari's "rationally related" test. 14 6 I believe that Professor
Goldberg's argument that the Indian commerce power can extend to individual Indians
as long as there is a congressionally identified nexus to a tribal interest adequately cures
any potential problems.
Under the argument developed in this article, however, this would mean that laws
that regulate individual Indians in matters unconnected to tribal self-government,
14 7
economic development, or cultural protection should be subjected to strict scrutiny
since the special treatment of Indians would become a racial classification under the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. Thus, certain laws that have
historically treated individual Indians differently should now be re-evaluated under strict
scrutiny. This should be the case for many of the liquor laws that prohibited the selling
of liquor to Indians. The question to ask here is not whether such laws were enacted for
the benefit of individual Indians, but whether they were enacted pursuant to the trust
relationship. In other words, are those laws connected to a tribal interest in that they
were enacted in order to promote tribal self-government, tribal economic self-

141. There is no question that the term "Indian tribes" has racial connotations. After all, the political entities
populating this country before the arrival of the white man were neither "Indian" nor "tribes." For sure, the
term "Indian" has a racial connotation. It was used in conjunction with the word "tribes" to encompass all preexisting political entities whose members were predominantly of the "Indian" race. The term "tribe" has
ethnological connotations in that, unlike all the citizens in a state, all the members of a tribe are considered
descended from common ancestors. "Tribes" also denotes an earlier form of organized society, perhaps
implying a pre-civilized status in that, etymologically speaking, a tribe can be viewed as a political
organization preceding the creation of a "state," which can be conceived as a consolidation of many tribes.
142. This argument had also been proposed by Professor Clinton in an earlier article. See Clinton, supra n.
54, at 980-82.
143. See Williams, supra n. 21, at 202-04.
144. Other scholars have agreed. See Gould, supra n. 8, at 713-17 (citing Fisher v. Dist. Ct., 424 U.S. 382
(1976); Antelope, 430 U.S. 641; and Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, as cases where use of the lesser degree of scrutiny
hurt Indian interests).
145. See Benjamin, supra n. 19; Carole Goldberg, American Indians and "Preferential" Treatment, 49
UCLA L. Rev. 943, 968-69 (2002).
146. Goldberg, supra n. 145, at 971 ("1 suggest that the Indian Commerce Clause response requires the
application of a criterion for 'Indianness,' and a nexus between benefiting individual Indians and benefiting a
tribe.").
147. For further discussion, see Wood, supra note 23 and accompanying text (enumerating the attributes of
tribal sovereignty protected under the trust relationship).
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sufficiency, or tribal cultural preservation? To the extent that such laws preempted tribal
choice on this issue, I do not think they were enacted to protect tribal self48
government. 1
Under my argument, this would mean that such laws could be valid only if they
withstood the strict scrutiny test. Even if they did, they would only be valid if Congress
could have enacted such laws under a regular version of its commerce power. While I
have no doubt that, under its regular Indian commerce power, Congress could enact laws
prohibiting the introduction of liquor for resale purposes inside Indian country, it would
not have been able to prohibit the sale of liquor to individual Indians outside Indian
reservations unless such prohibition was also applicable to everyone else. Similarly, it
could not have prohibited the drinking of liquor by Indians inside Indian reservations or
the making of liquor within Indian country for local consumption.
III.

CONCLUSION

Initially derived from the doctrine of discovery, the plenary power of Congress
over Indian tribes was first believed to come from the inherent right of the ultimate
sovereign to govern everything within its geographical boundaries. By the early 1900s,
the source of the plenary power had migrated to the trust doctrine and was thought to be
extra-constitutional. Finally, in the 1970s, the source was identified as the Constitution's
Indian Commerce Clause. 149 Yet, when it comes to the "plenary" aspect of the power, it
seems that the more things change the more they stay the same. The power is still
"plenary." This article has argued that this thinking shows that the Court wants to "have
its cake and eat it, too," when, in fact, they cannot have it both ways.
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that because the source of congressional
power is now thought to be derived from the Constitution, Congress can no longer deny
Indians their individual constitutional rights. This article has argued that the same
reasoning should apply to the rights of tribes to self-government. While the tribes' right
to self-government is not a constitutional right, the power of Congress to interfere with
such rights beyond the regulation of commerce should be confined to what is necessary
to carry out the trust relationship or, in other words, to protect what one scholar has
50
termed the "attributes of native sovereignty."1

148. For a comprehensive treatment of the liquor laws and support for this statement, see Robert J. Miller &
Maril Hazlett, The "Drunken Indian": Myth Distilled into Reality through FederalIndian Alcohol Policy, 28
Ariz. St. L.J. 223 (1996).
149. Also mentioned was the treaty power, but this power has not been used since 1871.
150. See Wood, supra n. 23.
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